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NEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Part I*
by Cecile E.M. Meijer and Amardeep Singh**
General
In the year 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) handed down, as of late October
2000, seven judgements. The Trial Chamber rendered two
judgements after trials on the merits (Blavskić and Kuprevskić),
and one judgement on allegations of contempt (Simić et al.),
in addition to numerous interlocutory decisions and orders.
Additionally, the Appeals Chamber rendered two judgements
on the merits in the Aleksovski case and the Furundvzija case, as
well as a sentencing judgement and a judgement on allega-
tions of contempt in the Tadić case.
Two new judges assumed their duties at the ICTY this year:
Judge Fausto Pocar of Italy replaced Judge Antonio Cassese and
was sworn in on February 8, 2000, and Judge Liu Daqun of China
was sworn in on April 3, 2000, replacing Judge Wang Tieya. They
will serve the remainder of their predecessors’ terms of office,
both of which end on November 16, 2001.
In February, France signed an agreement with the ICTY
regarding the enforcement of ICTY sentences on French ter-
ritory. In March, Spain became the seventh state to sign such
an agreement with the ICTY. Under this agreement, however,
Spain will consider only those cases where the sentence is no
longer than the maximum possible sentence for any crime
under Spanish criminal law, which currently is 30 years. Each
agreement will enter into force after France and Spain, respec-
tively, have notified the ICTY that it has satisfied the necessary
domestic implementing legislation. The other states that have
signed such agreements are Italy, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and
Austria. In September 2000, Finland for the first time received
two convicted persons from the ICTY—Aleksovski and Furund-
vzija—who will serve their sentences in Finland. Most recently,
Duvsko Tadić was moved from the UN Detention Unit in The
Hague to a German prison, following exequatur proceedings
(necessary to execute an ICTY judgement in Germany) and an
ad hoc agreement for this particular case between the ICTY and
the government of Germany.
The Appeals Chamber
Aleksovski Judgement
On March 24, 2000, the Appeals Chamber rendered its writ-
ten decision in Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-
A, following an appeal by Zlatko Aleksovski and by the prose-
cution against the Trial Chamber’s judgement and imposed
sentence. Among the main issues decided was the question of
precedent, i.e., the weight to be accorded to the Tribunal’s past
judgements. Additionally, for the first time the Appeals Cham-
ber lengthened a sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber.
Aleksovski, a Bosnian-Croat, was accused of mistreating
Bosnian-Muslim prisoners at the Kaonik prison in Bosnia-
Herzegovina while he was a warden of the prison. His indictment
included allegations, inter alia, of beatings, forced labor, and
allowing prisoners to be used as human shields. On May 7,
1999, in its oral pronouncement of the judgement, the Trial
Chamber had found Aleksovski guilty of violations of the laws
or customs of war, specifically “outrages against personal dignity,”
as recognized by Article 3 of the Tribunal’s Statute (violations
of the laws or customs of war). The Trial Chamber did not, how-
ever, find him guilty of “inhuman treatment” and “willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” as
recognized by Article 2(b) and Article 2(c) of the ICTY Statute
(grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions), respectively.
Aleksovski’s acquittal on these two counts was based on the
fact that the Trial Chamber’s majority did not consider the
Bosnian-Muslim victims as protected persons, because the con-
flict at the relevant time and place was not deemed to be of an
international character. The Trial Chamber sentenced Aleksovski
to two and one half years imprisonment. He was immediately
set free, however, because the sentence was less than time
already served. The written judgement had been rendered on
June 25, 1999.
Aleksovski raised four grounds of appeal, all of which were
rejected. One of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal concerned
the question whether the prosecution must demonstrate that the
perpetrator of a crime as defined under Article 3 of the Tri-
bunal’s Statute was “motivated by a contempt toward [an]other
person’s dignity in racial, religious, social, sexual or other dis-
criminatory sense.” The Appeals Chamber referred, inter alia,
to the 1995 Tadić Appeal on Jurisdiction decision, in which the Tri-
bunal identified the general requirements for prosecuting
under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and stated that proving dis-
criminatory intent or motivation is not among these require-
ments. The Appeals Chamber furthermore examined in this
respect the text and purpose of relevant provisions in the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, the commen-
taries by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), customary international law relating to this issue, as well
as pertinent ICTY jurisprudence. As a result, the Appeals Cham-
ber rejected this ground of appeal, finding that “it is not an ele-
ment of offences under Article 3 of the Statute, nor of the
offence of outrages upon personal dignity, that the perpetrator
had a discriminatory intent or motive.” 
The prosecution’s cross-appeals were more successful. The
first ground of cross-appeal contested the non-applicability of
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, and asserted that the Trial Cham-
ber applied the incorrect test in determining the nature of the
armed conflict. The prosecution argued the Trial Chamber
should have applied the “overall control” test. The prosecution
also contended that the Trial Chamber used the wrong test in
determining the victims’ status as protected persons.
Before discussing these contentions, however, the Appeals
Chamber considered the issue of what weight must be given to its
decisions and those of the Trial Chambers in subsequent cases. The
Appeals Chamber held that “in the interests of certainty and pre-
dictability, the Appeals Chambers should follow its previous deci-
sions, but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons
in the interests of justice.” In reaching this decision, the Appeals
Chamber discussed the jurisprudence of various common law
and civil law countries and concluded that domestic courts gen-
continued on next page
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erally follow past decisions unless a clear injustice would occur in
doing so. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recognized that the
Tribunal’s Statute is silent on the question of the binding force
of previous decisions. The Appeals Chamber nonetheless stated
that the right of appeal constitutes part of the right to a fair trial
and that “an aspect of the fair trial requirement is the right of an
accused to have like cases treated alike.” 
The Appeals Chamber continued that “the legal principle,”
or ratio decidendi, should be followed, and that “the obligation
to follow that principle only applies in similar cases, or sub-
stantially similar cases,” i.e., “the question raised by the facts in
the subsequent case is the same as the question decided by the
legal principle in the previous decision.” The Appeals Chambers
further held that the “ratio decidendi of its decisions is binding
on Trial Chambers;” decisions of Trial Chambers, however,
“have no binding force on each other, although a Trial Cham-
ber is free to follow the decision of another Trial Chamber if it
finds that decision persuasive.”
Having pronounced on this issue, the Appeals Chamber
returned to the prosecution’s first ground of cross-appeal, apply-
ing the aforementioned conclusions. First, the Appeals Chamber
addressed the issue of what test to apply when determining
whether a war is international in character. The Appeals Cham-
ber noted that it had developed in the Tadić case the less stringent
“overall control” test, under which it suffices that a “group is
under the ‘overall control’ of a State.” The Appeals Chamber found
that there was no “cogent reason to depart” from the principle set
forth in the Tadić decision. The Appeals Chamber thus held that
the “overall control” test was applicable in the Aleksovski case and
that the Trial Chamber should have used this test.
Second, the Appeals Chamber concluded that because the con-
flict at the relevant place and time was international in nature,
the victims were protected persons within the meaning of Arti-
cle 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This article defines pro-
tected persons as those persons who are “in the hands of a Party
to the Conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nation-
als.” Moreover, the Aleksovski Appeals Chamber confirmed the
Tadić finding and stated that “in certain circumstances, Article 4
may be given a wider construction so that a person may be
accorded protected status, notwithstanding the fact that he is of
the same nationality as his captors.” In contrast to the Trial
Chamber’s majority holding that the Bosnian Muslim victims
were not protected persons, the Appeals Chamber quoted the less
stringent criterion of Tadić, i.e., “allegiance to a Party to the con-
flict.” In following Tadić, the Appeals Chamber further stated it
“considers that this extended application of Article 4 meets the
object and purpose of Geneva Convention IV, and is particularly
apposite in the context of present-day inter-ethnic conflicts.”
The Appeals Chamber declined, however, to reverse the acquit-
tal on the two counts of grave breaches.
Another significant decision by the Appeal Chambers dealt
with its capacity to lengthen a sentence imposed by the Trial
Chamber. The prosecution appealed Aleksovski’s sentence on
several grounds, including that the sentence imposed by the Trial
Chamber was too short. Specifically, the prosecution argued that
the Trial Chamber failed to give due weight to the gravity of
Aleksovski’s offenses, and failed to impose a sentence long
enough to deter others from future violations. 
The Appeals Chamber agreed that the Trial Chamber erred
in its sentencing determination of two and one half years and
found support for its authority to review the sentence in the
Tadić sentencing judgement (see below). Citing Tadić, the
Aleksovski Appeals Chamber held that an Appeals Chamber
“should not intervene in the exercise of the Trial Chamber’s dis-
cretion with regard to sentence unless there is a ‘discernible
error’” in its length. In this case the Appeals Chamber found that
the Trial Chamber erred by “giving insufficient weight to the
gravity of the conduct of the Appellant and failing to treat his
position as commander as an aggravating feature.” The Appeals
Chamber stated that Aleksovski’s offenses were especially grave
because as the prison’s highest official, he not only failed to pre-
vent or punish abuses against prisoners, but participated in
them, and aided and abetted in their commission. Conse-
quently, the Appeals Chamber lengthened Aleksovski’s term of
imprisonment from two and one half years, to seven years. As
a result of the Appeals Chamber’s decision, Aleksovski was re-
imprisoned after being set free by the Trial Chamber.
The Appeals Chamber rejected the prosecution’s argument
that the short length of the Trial Chamber’s sentence was faulty
on grounds of deterrence. In so doing, the Appeals Chamber
quoted a portion of the Tadić sentencing judgement, stating, “this
factor [deterrence] must not be accorded undue prominence
in the overall assessment of the sentences to be imposed on per-
sons convicted by the International Tribunal.” The Appeals
Chamber maintained, “[a]n equally important factor is retri-
bution” as a means of expressing “the outrage of the interna-
tional community at these crimes.”
Tadić Sentencing Judgement
In a decision on two sentencing judgement appeals by Duvsko
Tadić, the Appeals Chamber addressed many pressing issues
regarding sentencing of those found guilty by the Tribunal. The
issues before the Chamber included whether a punitive distinc-
tion exists between a war crime and a crime against humanity. The
Appeals Chamber’s Judgement in Sentencing Appeals of January 26,
2000, is the result of a joinder of two appeals against sentencing
judgements by the Trial Chamber: the first of July 14, 1997, and
the second of November 11, 1999, on additional counts.
Tadić appealed the sentencing judgments on a total of nine
grounds. Of these, four are of particular significance. First,
Tadić alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in holding that, all
things being equal, crimes against humanity should attract a
higher sentence than war crimes. The majority of the Appeals
Chamber, in a contested holding, disagreed with the Trial
Chamber’s holding on this point. The Appeals Chamber deter-
mined there exists “in law no distinction between the serious-
ness of a crime against humanity and that of a war crime.” The
Appeals Chamber reasoned that neither the Statute of the Tri-
bunal, nor its Rules of Procedure and Evidence contained such
distinction between the two crimes. The Appeals Chamber also
referred to Article 8(1) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court to assert that, in its view, that article does not
articulate a difference in penalty for the two types of crimes. 
In a strong dissent, Judge Cassese argued that where an act
may be considered both a crime against humanity and a war
crime, a greater criminal penalty should attach to the crime
against humanity. Judge Cassese pointed out that a crime against
humanity, unlike a war crime, requires the additional element
of knowledge by the perpetrator that his or her actions are
part of a “widespread or systematic practice.” This additional ele-
ment, according to Judge Cassese, requires that, all things
being equal, a greater criminal penalty attached to a crime
against humanity than to a war crime (this issue was revisited in
the Furund vzija appeal, as noted below).
ICTY, continued from previous page
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Second, Tadić argued he deserved credit for the whole time
he served in Germany awaiting trial on the same charges, and
not just for the time he served in that country after the Tribunal
requested Germany to defer the proceedings. According to
Rule 101(D) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, credit must be given for time a person “was detained in
custody pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial or
appeal.” Yet the Appeals Chamber held that despite the word-
ing of this article, “fairness requires” that Tadić be given credit
for the entire time served in Germany because he was held
there for proceedings involving “substantially the same crimi-
nal conduct as that for which he now stands convicted at the
International Tribunal.”
Third, Tadić maintained that the calculation of his minimum
sentence should begin on the date the Trial Chamber pro-
nounced its sentence and not when his appeal is being deter-
mined. The Appeals Chamber agreed, holding that the starting
point of any minimum sentence should commence on the date
of sentencing by the Trial Chamber.
The Appeals Chamber reasoned that
starting the calculation of a mini-
mum sentence after an appeal is
completed could discourage con-
victed persons from using the right
to appeal, because such a rule would
fail to recognize the considerable
time they spend imprisoned while
awaiting a decision on appeal. Such
a result would also deprive the
Appeals Chamber of “the opportunity to hear appeals on sub-
stantial questions of law.” The Appeals Chamber held, however,
that when calculating the minimum term, no credit was due pur-
suant to Rule 101(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Fourth, Tadić contended that the Trial Chamber, in accor-
dance with Article 24(1) of the ICTY Statute, should have given
greater weight to the general sentencing practices in the former
Yugoslavia. In arguing that his sentence on particular counts
ranging from 6 to 25 years was too long, Tadić pointed out that
in the former Yugoslavia the most severe term of imprisonment
that a court could impose was 20 years. The Appeals Chamber held
that while Yugoslav practice should be taken into account by
the Tribunal, it is not controlling in sentencing determinations.
In support of this proposition, the Appeals Chamber relied, inter
alia, on Rule 101(A) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, which allows the Tribunal to sentence a convicted person
to imprisonment for the remainder of his life.
Finally, the Appeals Chamber reduced the higher end of
Duvsko Tadić’s prison sentence from 25 to 20 years, considering
the higher sentence “excessive.” Looking at the ICTY and ICTR
jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber opined that sentences
generally need to reflect the “relative significance of the role of
the Appellant” and that Tadić ranked low in comparison to oth-
ers in the command structure. As a result of this Appeals Cham-
ber decision, Tadić’s minimum term of ten years imprison-
ment must be calculated from July 14, 1997, the date of the first
sentencing judgement by the Trial Chamber, and time previously
served will not apply to this minimum term. Taking into account
the time Tadić served prior to this appeals judgement, his
imprisonment will end no earlier than July 14, 2007. On Octo-
ber 31, 2000, Tadić was transferred to Germany to complete the
remainder of his sentence.
Furundvzija Judgement
On July 21, 2000, the Appeals Chamber, in Prosecutor v. Anto
Furund vzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, rendered a decision on an
appeal by Furundvzija against the Trial Chamber’s judgement and
sentence of December 10, 1998. The Trial Chamber had found
Furundvzija guilty of two counts of violations of the laws or cus-
toms of war (Article 3 of the ICTY Statute). Specifically, Furund-
vzija was convicted and sentenced to ten years imprisonment for
torture as a co-perpetrator, and to eight years concurrently for
outrages upon personal dignity, including rape, as an aider
and abetter. The Appellant raised five grounds of appeal,
including allegations of judicial bias. In addition, the Appeals
Chamber briefly considered the issue of whether crimes against
humanity should be punished more harshly than war crimes. All
grounds of appeal failed and the Appeals Chamber affirmed the
imposed sentences.
Of particular importance is the fourth ground of appeal
which, reminiscent of the Pinochet case, stated that Judge Mumba,
Presiding Judge in the case before the Trial Chamber, should
have recused herself in accordance with Rule 15(A) of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, because of her previous
membership on the UN Commission on the Status of Women
(UNCSW). Without actually claiming that Judge Mumba had
been biased, Appellant alleged that
she “should have been disqualified
as an appearance was created that
she had sat in judgement in a case
that could advance and in fact did
advance a legal and political agenda
which she helped to create whilst a
member of the UNCSW.” 
Addressing this issue for the first
time, the Appeals Chamber articu-
lated principles for the interpreta-
tion and application of the impartiality requirement of Rule
15(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. In so doing, the
Appeals Chamber determined that a judge “is not impartial if
it is shown that actual bias exists.” The Appeals Chamber fur-
ther decided that an unacceptable appearance of bias includes
a situation where “the circumstances would lead a reasonable
observer, properly informed, to reasonably apprehend bias.”
Quoting the Supreme Court of Canada, the Tribunal understood
this to mean that a “reasonable person must be an informed per-
son, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, includ-
ing the traditions of integrity and impartiality that form a part
of the background and apprised also of the fact that impartiality
is one of the duties that Judges swear to uphold.” 
Applying this principle, the Appeals Chamber found no
substance to this ground of appeal. The Tribunal reasoned
that Judge Mumba served on the UNCSW as her country’s rep-
resentative, and not in a personal capacity. Moreover, the
Appeals Chamber asserted that the UNCSW promotes UN goals
and objectives, regardless of whether these coincided with the
judge’s personal convictions. Furthermore, the Appeals Cham-
ber pointed to Article 13(1) of the ICTY Statute, requiring that
judges be experienced in international law, including human
rights law. The Appeals Chamber held that “the possession of
experience in any of those areas by a Judge cannot, in the
absence of the clearest contrary evidence, constitute evidence
of bias or partiality.”
In the fifth ground of appeal, Furundvzija claimed that the
sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber constituted “cruel and
unusual punishment,” and should be lowered to a maximum of
six years. The Appeals Chamber disagreed with the Appellant
and found that there does not yet exist a certain “penal regime”
that should be followed in sentence determinations. It further
found nothing in the ICTY’s jurisprudence to support the
argument that crimes resulting in a victim’s death must be
ICTY, continued from previous page
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punished more harshly than other crimes. The Tribunal also fol-
lowed the ratio decidendi in the Tadić  Sentencing Judgement and
confirmed that war crimes and crimes against humanity are
equally grave offences and should be punished accordingly. In
a Declaration appended to the judgement, Judge Vohrah
disagreed, arguing, similar to Judge Cassese in the Tadić
Sentencing Judgement, that “when all things are equal,” a
crime against humanity is a more serious crime than a war
crime, and that “ordinarily this additional gravity requires that
the person convicted of a crime against humanity should receive
a longer sentence than a person convicted of the same act as a
war crime.”
Contempt cases
In 2000, the ICTY issued two important judgements in contempt
of court proceedings. The Appeals Chamber issued an unanimous
judgement against Milan Vujin, former counsel for Duvsko Tadić.
In addition, Trial Chamber III rendered judgement on contempt
of court allegations against Milan Simić and his counsel.
Tadić
The Appeals Chamber dealt with the issue of contempt pro-
ceedings against Mr. Milan Vujin, counsel in the Tadić case, as well
as the source of the Tribunal’s authority to deal with such pro-
ceedings and punish those found guilty of contempt. The alle-
gations of contempt date back to conduct during the time of
preparations for the appeal in the Tadić case, in particular the
preparations for an (ultimately unsuccessful) application in
accordance with Rule 115 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure
and Evidence (the presentation of additional evidence to the
Appeals Chamber). After receiving information from Mr. Vujin’s
co-counsel that Vujin had possibly engaged in misrepresentations
to the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber issued a Scheduling Order
on February 10, 1999, requiring Vujin to respond to allegations
of contempt. Tadić and the prosecution appeared in the contempt
proceedings as interested parties. 
The Tribunal stated it was exercising its power to initiate con-
tempt proceedings in accordance with Rule 77(E) of the
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which states that
the Tribunal may hold in contempt those “who knowingly and
willfully interfere with its administration of justice.” Though there
is no customary international law on this matter, the Appeals
Chamber noted the concept of contempt is common to the
major legal systems around the world. It concluded that it pos-
sessed “an inherent jurisdiction” to ensure that its basic judicial
functions are “not frustrated” by conduct that obstructs the
administration of justice.
Regarding the nature of the contempt allegations, on January
31, 2000, the Appeals Chamber held Milan Vujin in contempt
of the Tribunal on different grounds. First, the Appeals Cham-
ber found that Mr. Vujin had, in a submission to the Tribunal,
knowingly misrepresented the date of a particular statement and
misrepresented that he had personally taken the statement.
Second, Mr. Vujin falsely represented to the Tribunal that a sus-
pect had committed a murder when the witness to whom he
attributed this assertion had specifically told him that another
person had committed the murder. Finally, the Appeals Cham-
ber found that Mr. Vujin had manipulated witnesses by instruct-
ing them not to mention any names in statements, thus with-
holding evidence that may have exonerated Tadić. In making
these findings, the Appeals Chamber applied the “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” standard.
The Appeals Chamber regarded the contempt as serious,
especially where the lawyer’s conduct had been against his
client’s interest, noting that it struck “at the very heart of the
criminal justice system.” The Tribunal ordered Mr. Vujin to pay
a fine of Dfl 15,000 to the Tribunal’s Registrar, and directed the
Registrar to consider striking his name from the list of assigned
counsel and report his conduct to his professional organization.
The Appeals Chamber further ordered the publication of cer-
tain specified documents.
Simić et al.
On June 30, 2000, Trial Chamber III issued its written Judge-
ment in the Matter of Contempt Allegations against an Accused and his
Counsel. The Trial Chamber found Milan Simić, and his attorney
Branislav Avramović, not guilty of threatening, bribing, and
requesting a potential witness to commit perjury. The Trial
Chamber determined these allegations had not been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In a case that hinged on findings of
fact rather than findings of law, the Trial Chamber found that the
testimony of “Witness Agnes,” upon whom the charges of con-
tempt solely relied, could not support a finding of contempt. 
* Volume 8, Issues 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Brief will cover the
remaining ICTY judgements of 2000 and the jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda over that same period.
** Cecile Meijer is the Legal Coordinator of the War Crimes Research
Office at the Washington College of Law. Amardeep Singh is an LL.M.
candidate at the Washington College of Law and Associate Editor for
the Human Rights Brief.
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